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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to introduce Credit Risk Mitigation (CRM) as the methodology for the recognition 
of collateral for retail lending which is Basel II complaint. CRM is the technique that reduces the credit risk associated 
with an exposure or exposures which the credit institution continues to hold. CRM can be applied in both possible 
approaches that Basel II offers for the retail segment: the standardized approach and the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) 
approach. The standardized approach is relatively easy to apply and it defines standard risk weights, whereas the IRB 
approach requires internal estimates of risk components in determining the capital requirement for a given exposure. 
The risk components include measures of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and the exposure at 
default (EAD) and serve as inputs to the risk weight functions that have been developed for separate asset classes. 
Keywords: Basel II, Credit Risk Mitigation, standardized approach, internal ratings-based approach. 
JEL Classification: G18, G32. 
 
Introduction♦ 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision issued a revised framework on Interna-
tional Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards (hereafter “Basel II” or the “re-
vised Framework”). When following the “internal 
ratings-based” (IRB) approach to Basel II, banking 
institutions will be allowed to use their own internal 
measures for key drivers of credit risk as primary 
inputs to their minimum regulatory capital calcula-
tion subject to meeting certain conditions and to 
explicit supervisory approval. In light of the need 
under Basel II for banks and their supervisors to 
assess the soundness and appropriateness of internal 
credit risk measurement and management systems, 
the development of methodologies for validating 
external and internal rating systems is clearly an 
important issue. More specifically, there is a need to 
develop means for validating the systems used to 
generate the parameters (such as PD, LGD, EAD 
and the underlying risk ratings) that serve as inputs 
to the IRB approach to credit risk. In this context, 
validation comprises a range of approaches and 
tools used to assess the soundness of these elements 
of IRB systems. In anticipation of the need for more 
knowledge regarding validation methodologies, in 
2002, the Research Task Force (RTF) formed a sub-
group (the Validation Group) to review and develop 
research on the validation of rating systems that 
would be useful to banks and supervisors as they 
consider options for implementing Basel II. The 
work of the Validation Group collected in this vol-
ume of studies addresses a number of topics on rat-
ing system validation, with a particular focus on 
empirical validation methods. The Validation Group 
consists of representatives from eleven countries. 
The main objectives of the project have been: 
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♦ to classify rating systems and their dynamic 
properties, and to develop a common terminol-
ogy for validation purposes; 
♦ to review validation methodologies that are 
currently applied in bank practice; and 
♦ to analyze validation methodologies for the three 
key risk components: probability of default (PD), 
loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default 
(EAD) from a theoretical perspective. 
Although validation is foremost the responsibility of 
banks, both bank risk managers and bank supervisors 
need to develop a thorough understanding of valida-
tion methods. Supervisors will need to review banks’ 
validation processes and may also need to employ 
validation methods in evaluating whether banks’ rating 
systems comply with the operating standards set forth 
by Basel II. Some validation methods, such as bench-
marking risk parameters across banks, may be more 
practical for supervisors to implement than for banks 
to implement. The focus of the research in this paper 
has been on validation methods in general, without 
regard to whether those methods are implemented by 
banks or their supervisors. 
1. Credit Risk Mitigation 
Credit Risk Mitigation (CRM) is “a technique used 
by a credit institution to reduce the credit risk as-
sociated with an exposure or exposures which the 
credit institution continues to hold”1. A collateral-
ized transaction is a transaction where the credit 
exposure or potential credit exposure of the credit 
institution to a counterparty is hedged – in whole 
or in part – by collateral posted by the counterparty 
or by a third party on behalf of the counterparty. 
Collateralized credit exposures must have a risk-
weighted exposure amount lower than the same 
credit exposure without credit protection2. 
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 4 (30). 
2 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 93 (2). 
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It must be differentiated between two types of CRM 
techniques: 
♦ Under “funded credit protection” (e.g., real es-
tate, financial  instruments) is to be understood a 
CRM technique where the reduction of the 
credit risk exposure of a credit institution de-
rives from the right of the credit institution in 
case of default to1: 
a) liquidate or retain, at least for a certain period 
of time, certain assets or amounts; 
b) obtain transfer or appropriation of certain as-
sets or amounts; 
c) retain certain assets or amounts; 
d) reduce the amount of the exposure that has 
defaulted through the realization of the collat-
eral. The claim of the institution on the whole 
exposure is then reduced to the difference be-
tween the total amount of the exposure and the 
claim of the institution that was covered by the 
realization of the collateral; 
e) replace the amount of the exposure that has de-
faulted through the realization of the collateral. 
The new exposure of the debtor to the credit insti-
tution is the difference between the amount of the 
former exposure and the amount of the collateral. 
Due to this replacement of the former exposure of 
the client by the new one, the credit institution can 
consider the new account as a re-structured  one 
with losses on irrecoverable debts. 
♦ “Unfunded credit protection” (such as guarantee) 
is a CRM technique where the reduction of the 
credit risk exposure of a credit institution derives 
from the undertaking of a third party to pay an 
amount in the event of a default of the borrower or 
on the occurrence of other specified events2. 
According to the EU Directive, credit institutions 
using the standardized approach or the IRB ap-
proach with supervisory loss parameters are allowed 
to recognize CRM for the calculation of risk-
weighted exposures as described under Annex VIII3. 
However, for credit institutions under the IRB ap-
proach, this is only valid if they are not using their 
own estimates of LGD and of CCF to obtain CRM 
effects4. For credit institutions using their own esti-
mates of LGD and of CCF (Advanced IRB for retail 
exposures), the eligibility criteria and minimum 
recognition requirements set under the Annex VIII 
of the European Directive 2006/48/EC are applica-
ble, the calculation of CRM effects on RWA will 
take place according to Annex VII of the aforesaid 
Directive. 
Table 1. Overview of the main differences between standardized and IRB approaches51 2345 
Standardized approach Anvanced IRB approach 
Basel II approach Eligibility Valuation frequency Risk-weight of the 
collateralized part 
Eligibility Valuation  
frequency 
CRM 
 effects on 
Category of collaterals 
Physical collaterals: 
1) Residential real estate (private house, 
flat, residential land, other) 
yes Every three years 35% yes Every three years LGD 
2) Commercial real estate (business 
property, warehouse, industrial land, other) 
yes Once a year 50% yes Once a year LGD 
3) Other physical collaterals (truck, ship, 
van, equipment, etc.)  
no   yes Once a year LGD 
Life insurance policies yes Every six months Risk-weight of the 
insurance company 
yes Every six months LGD 
Cash:  
Cash (debtor’s exposure and collateral are 
labeled in the same currency) 
yes Every six months 0% yes Every six months LGD 
Cash (debtor’s exposure and collateral are 
labeled in the different  currencies) 
yes Every six months 20% yes Every six months LGD 
Gold yes Every six months 0% yes Every six months LGD 
Equities: 
1) Equities traded on a main index (ordi-
nary shares or preference shares) 
yes Every six months >20% yes Every six months LGD 
 
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 4 (31). Points d) and e) mean that the credit institution can minder its losses to the difference between the expo-
sure and the value of the collateral when it realizes (e.g., sells) the collateral. 
2 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 4 (32) and EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 92 (4). 
3 This concerns only non-retail exposures that are treated under the Foundation IRB Approach. For retail exposures, the Advanced IRB approach 
must be used and there is no possibility to use supervisory loss parameters under the IRB approach. Credit institutions have to make their own esti-
mates of loss parameters for retail exposures. 
4 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 91. 
5 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VI, VII, VIII. 
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Table 2 (cont.). Overview of the main differences between standardized and IRB approaches 
2) Equities not included in a main index but 
traded on a recognized exchange 
no   yes Every six months LGD 
Debt securities yes Every six months Risk-weight depending 
on the issuers (>20%) 
yes Every six months LGD 
Leased properties 
1) Residential real estate 
yes Every three years 35% yes Every six month LGD 
2) Commercial  real estate yes Once a year 50% yes Every three years LGD 
3) Other physical collaterals no   yes Once a year LGD 
Guarantee provided by: 
1) central government and central banks 
yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes Once a year LGD 
2) regional government and local authori-
ties 
yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
3) multilateral development banks yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
4) international organizations with a 0% risk-
weight under the standardized approach 
yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
5) PSE yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
6) institutions yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
7) other corporates entities yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
8) insurance undertakings yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
9) reinsurance undertakings yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
10) export credit agencies yes  Risk-weight of the 
guarantor 
yes  LGD 
Source: internal sources. 
1.1. General requirements for Credit Risk Mitiga-
tion. CRM may be recognized by supervisors as long 
as the techniques or collaterals used are eligible. The 
eligibility of the collaterals used in the context of CRM 
techniques depends on the approach used under Basel 
II to calculate the risk-weighted exposures (standard-
ized approach or IRB approach)1. In addition, under 
the standardized approach, the bank has the possibility 
to choose between two methods to valuate its financial 
collaterals. Consequently, it must be further differenti- 
ated between the Financial Collateral Simple Method 
and the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method 
regarding financial collaterals. 
The following table presents an overview of main 
differences between the standardized approach and the 
IRB approach concerning eligibility, valuation fre-
quency and risk-weights used.  
In order to determine if the collaterals can be recog-
nized for credit protection in the bank, following steps 
must be realized: 
1st step: Fulfilment of operational and risk management 
requirements
The bank is not allowed 
to use CRM
No
3rd step: Fulfilment of the legal certainty requirements for collaterals
Yes
No recognition of the 
collateral possible
No
4th step: Fulfilment of additional requirements depending on the 
approach chosen
Yes
No recognition of the 
collateral possible
No
5th step: Identification of maturity mismatch
Yes
Mismatch identified
6th step: Calculation of CRM effects (risk-weights or LGD modelling)
Step of the CRM process
Stage result of the CRM process
2nd step: Fulfilment of general eligibility requirements for collaterals
Yes
No recognition of the 
collateral possible
No
According to RZB Group 
Directive for Collateral 
Evaluation, maturity 
mismatches between 
exposures and collaterals are 
not allowed. Consequently, 
collaterals are not recognized
in case of maturity mismatch.
There is no maturity mismatch
 
Source: internal sources.  
Fig. 1. Steps for calculation of the CRM effects 1
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VIII, Part 1, point 6. 
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1st step: Fulfilment of operational and risk manage-
ment requirements 
In order to be allowed to use CRM techniques, each 
unit bank must be able to prove to competent au-
thorities that it has adequate risk management proc-
esses to control the risks it is exposed to in the col-
lateralized transaction1. This includes that: 
1) each unit of the bank possesses efficient proce-
dures for the eligibility determination and rec-
ognition of collaterals under the approach cho-
sen; 
2) each unit of the bank must regularly check the 
effectiveness of the credit protection and assess 
all risks related to the collateralized transaction. 
This includes, for example: 
– a regular check (e.g., once a year) that there is 
a market for the collaterals in order to receive 
the proper value of the collateral; 
– a regular check of the actual state and condi-
tions of the collateral if it is a real estate prop-
erty since the value can be influenced by new 
construction. 
Consequently, processes assessing the CRM must 
be included in the credit risk management processes 
of the bank, i.e. each unit of the bank must have 
defined and documented procedures concerning 
valuation methods and valuation frequency of each 
type of collateral2. 
2nd step: Checking the collateral eligibility 
In order to be eligible, collateral must principally 
fulfil following requirements: 
♦ Sufficient liquidity and stable value over time 
for funded protection. 
Assets recognized for funded credit protection must 
be sufficiently liquid (i.e., there exists an efficient 
and legal market for the collateral) and their value 
over time should be sufficiently stable to provide 
appropriate certainty as to the achieved credit pro-
tection, depending on the approach chosen under 
Basel II and on the degree of recognition allowed. 
The value of the collateral must not depend on the 
creditworthiness of the obligor in a too important 
way3,4. 
♦ Sufficient reliability of guarantors and legal 
effectiveness of unfunded credit protection. 
Guarantors recognized for unfunded credit protec-
tion must be sufficiently reliable (e.g., the guarantor 
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VIII, Part 2, point 1. 
2 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 92 (2). 
3 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 92 (3) and 92 (4). 
4 This means, for example, that equities issued by the debtor are not 
eligible collaterals. However, further concretization of this phrase still 
has to be done by FMA. 
has a reputation of fulfilling his/her commitments in 
similar contracts or the guarantor has a sufficient 
financial standing) and the protection agreement 
must be legally effective in the relevant jurisdic-
tions. By fulfilling strict requirements concerning 
the legal effectiveness, the protection agreement 
provides appropriate certainty and thus can be rec-
ognized as credit protection under the approach 
chosen under Basel II. The certainty of the involve-
ment of the guarantor must also be assessed with 
regards to the degree of recognition of the collater-
alization, i.e. the probability with which the guaran-
tor is going to hold his/her engagement regarding 
the unfunded credit protection5. 
3rd step: Checking the legal certainty of the collat-
erals 
When the bank has fulfilled the first two steps, it is 
allowed to use collaterals, however, only under the 
condition that the legal certainty of each collateral is 
generally assured. The legal certainty of the collat-
erals involved in the transaction covers at least6 the 
four criteria listed below: 
♦ Legal effectiveness and enforceability in all 
relevant jurisdictions, i.e. jurisdictions of all 
countries involved in the transaction. 
In order to fulfil these requirements, the legal cer-
tainty of the credit protection must cover the actions 
(including filing and registration of the collateral 
contract), the steps taken, the procedures and poli-
cies implemented by each unit of the bank7. The 
checking of the legal certainty of the collaterals can 
be performed either internally or can be outsourced 
by each unit of the bank (e.g., law firm). If the bank 
decides to check the legal certainty of the collateral 
internally, it must define standards and processes in 
order to ensure the legal enforceability on a regular 
basis for the length of the contract (e.g., regular 
involvement of legal advisors). Internal concepts 
documenting standards and processes chosen by the 
bank must cover at least the following two topics: 
1) internal/outsourced continuous monitoring of 
legal framework development in countries im-
plied in collateralized transactions; 
2) identification of contracts that are concerned 
by changes of the legal framework. 
The requirements regarding legal enforceability 
concern standard contracts as well as individual 
ones. For individual contracts, each one must be 
checked regarding its legal enforceability in the 
                                                 
5 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 92 (5). 
6 For all collateral types, the EU Directive defines stronger requirements 
to check their legal certainty. The concerned requirements will be 
defined in corresponding sections of this document. 
7 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 92 (1). 
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 3, Issue 2, 2008 
58 
concerned jurisdictions. For standard contracts, the 
checking has to take place only once, before the 
contract is in use. The legal enforceability of each 
contract must be checked if laws concerning this 
type of contracts are changed. 
♦ Sufficient level of risk reduction. 
Eligible credit protection is to be recognized by 
supervisors when reduction in the level of credit risk 
on the exposure as a result of the CRM is suffi-
ciently certain, e.g., the contract setting the collat-
eral to the transaction cannot be changed unilater-
ally or the realization of the collateral can be led in a 
defined timeframe. Therefore, each bank must pos-
sess efficient processes for the realization of its col-
laterals. 
In addition, each bank requires that the collateral is 
realizable in cash within a reasonable time, proven 
by a favorable track record of the jurisdiction in the 
concerned country. Each unit of the bank must es-
pecially pay attention not to take collateral items 
which could lead to reputation damage in case of its 
effective realization. E.g., the bank takes a mortgage 
on a hospital building and if the debtor defaults, it is 
not realistic that the credit institution will use this 
collateral since it could damage its reputation. This 
is also valid for buildings having a strategic impor-
tance, the realization of which could lead to political 
or reputation problems for the bank. 
Regarding funded protection, the legal rights of the 
bank must be enforceable in case of the default, 
insolvency or bankruptcy of the counterparty or of 
the custodian of the collateral. If the transaction 
documentation mentions additional specified credit 
events relating to the counterparty or of the custo-
dian, this right may be used as well1.  
For all collaterals, the contestation risk needs to be 
assessed and taken into account while estimating the 
legal certainty and effectiveness of the collateral. 
4th step: Additional requirements depending on the 
approach chosen 
Once the legal certainty of collaterals has been 
checked, further requirements set by the EU Direc-
tive must be fulfilled. These requirements concern 
operational systems of the bank and characteristics 
of collaterals (stronger requirements for legal cer-
tainty, eligibility and recognition). 
5th step: Identification of “maturity mismatch” 
“Maturity mismatch” means that the residual matur-
ity of the protected exposure concerned is longer 
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 4 (31). 
than the residual maturity of the credit protection 
involved. 
If there is a maturity mismatch, the credit protection 
cannot be recognised according to the EU Directive 
in the following cases2: 
a) the residual maturity of the credit protection is 
less than three months3; 
b) the original maturity is less than one year4. 
Currency mismatch 
“Currency mismatch” means that the credit protec-
tion is labelled in a currency different from the cur-
rency of the exposure5. Currency mismatches are 
allowed according to the EU Directive 2006/48/EC 
under the standardized and IRB approaches6.  
6th step: Determination of the CRM effects 
After determining which collaterals can be used by 
the bank as such, the risk mitigation on the exposure 
must be calculated according to the approach chosen 
under Basel II. 
The CRM has an effect only on the part of the expo-
sure that is covered by the credit protection, as valu-
ated according to the regulatory requirements. If the 
amount collateralized or guaranteed is lower than 
the amount of the exposure and the secured and 
unsecured portions are of equal seniority (i.e., the 
bank and the guarantor share losses on a pro-rata 
basis), capital relief will be performed on a propor-
tional basis. This means that the protected part of 
the exposure will receive the treatment applicable to 
the collateral or counterparty, while the remaining 
part of the exposure (not collateralized) will be 
treated as unsecured. 
1.2. Credit Risk Mitigation for retail exposures 
under the standardized approach. Banks use a 
number of techniques to mitigate the credit risks to 
which they are exposed. Exposure may be collater-
alized in whole or in part with cash or securities, or 
a loan exposure may be guaranteed by a third party. 
No transaction in which CRM techniques are used 
should receive a higher capital requirement than an 
otherwise identical transaction where such tech-
niques are not used. 
The effects of CRM will not be double counted. 
Therefore, no additional supervisory recognition of 
                                                 
2 Maturity mismatch is not allowed for financial collaterals under the 
Financial Collaterals Simplified Approach. The definition and restric-
tions given here concerned other collaterals under the standardized 
approach and financial collaterals under the Financial Collateral Com-
prehensive Method and the IRB approach. 
3 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VIII, Part 4, point 1. 
4 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VIII, Part 4, point 2. 
5 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VIII, Part 3, point 84. 
6 Currency mismatches for collaterals are allowed under the standard-
ized approach under certain restrictions. 
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CRM for regulatory capital purposes will be granted 
on claims for which an issue-specific rating is used 
that already reflects that CRM. Principal-only rat-
ings will also not be allowed within the framework 
of CRM. Although banks use CRM techniques to 
reduce their credit risk, these techniques give rise to 
risks (residual risks) which may render the overall 
risk reduction less effective. Where these risks are 
not adequately controlled, supervisors may impose 
additional capital charges or take other supervisory 
actions as detailed in Pillar 2. 
While the use of CRM techniques reduces or trans-
fers credit risk, it simultaneously may increase other 
risks to the bank, such as legal, operational, liquidity 
and market risks. Therefore, it is imperative that 
banks employ robust procedures and processes to 
control these risks, including strategy; consideration 
of the underlying credit; valuation; policies and 
procedures; systems; control of roll-off risks; and 
management of concentration risk arising from the 
bank’s use of CRM techniques and its interaction 
with the bank’s overall credit risk profile. 
The Pillar 3 requirements must also be observed for 
banks to obtain capital relief in respect of any CRM 
techniques. 
1.2.1. Qualitative requirements for the standardized 
approach. The rules set out in this section are appli-
cable to the banking book retail exposures under the 
standardized approach. 
Specific operational requirements must be fulfilled 
by each unit of the bank under the standardized ap-
proach in order to fulfil the minimum requirements 
for recognition of their collaterals1: 
♦ A proper documentation of the collateralized 
transactions.  
This includes a clear identification of the credit in-
stitution, the debtor (name, address, etc.) and of the 
collateral(s) involved in the transaction (location in 
case of physical collateral, owner, value, etc.). 
Moreover, each unit of the bank must check whether 
the relevant jurisdictions are already mentioned in 
the documentation of a transaction. The documenta-
tion must also be stored during at least the whole 
duration of the collateralized transaction. 
♦  Clear and robust procedures for the timely 
liquidation of the collateral. 
This means that each unit of the bank must possess a 
handbook for the liquidation for each type of collat-
eral, determining the different steps of the liquida-
tion (contact with lawyers if necessary, experts for 
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VI, Part 1, points 44 to 60 and 
Annex VIII, Part 2, point 6. 
the valuation, etc.) as well as trained persons re-
sponsible for the liquidation.  
♦ Strong procedures and processes for the risk 
management. 
The risk management must especially cover the 
control of risks arising out of collateralization (fail-
ure or reduction of the credit protection), the valua-
tion of the continuous risks and of the risks associ-
ated with the termination of the credit protection. 
This means that, for each type of collaterals, the 
bank must possess a handbook defining procedures 
for risk assessment, risk monitoring and “limits” 
from which the reduction of the credit protection 
must have to be tracked by a regular monitoring 
(early-warning system). 
The risk management process also covers the de-
termination of concentration risks and their effects 
on the risk profile of the bank. Thus for each type of 
product, the bank must check that diversified collat-
erals are used to collateralize exposures (e.g., real 
estate must at least have a different geographical 
location). 
♦ Documented policies and practices concerning 
the types and amounts of collaterals accepted. 
♦ A regular valuation system of the financial col-
lateral at market value (at least every six 
months or when a significant decrease of its 
market value might have occurred). 
Real estates are submitted to different treatments: 
Residential Real Estates (RRE) must be valuated at 
least every three years, whereas Commercial Real 
Estates (CRE) must be valuated at least once a year. 
In case of important changes in the valuation condi-
tions of a real estate, the valuation must be more 
frequent. 
♦ Processes to check that custodians strictly sepa-
rate the collaterals from their own assets. 
1.3. Credit Risk Mitigation for retail exposures 
under the IRB approach.  In this section differences 
between the standardized and the IRB approaches for 
the treatment and utilization of CRM techniques will 
be analyzed. Compared to the standardized approach, 
CRM techniques under the IRB approach introduce 
new types of collaterals to be recognized as eligible 
and new requirements for the collateral types already 
recognized under the standardized approach. How-
ever, the main difference between CRM under those 
two approaches is in the way capital requirements are 
calculated. Namely CRM under the IRB approach 
operates through modelling of the LGD parameter 
whereas the CRM under the standardized approach is 
based on a substitution of the risk-weight of the 
debtor by the risk-weight of the protection provider. 
Credit institutions are authorized to derive their LGD 
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own estimates from realized losses and appropriate 
estimates of PDs1. 
Rating systems are a cornerstone for the calculation of 
banks’ regulatory capital charge in the internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach of the revised Framework 
(Basel II) because they are the basis for the determina-
tion of a borrower’s probability of default (PD). The 
PD and the other two risk components, loss given 
default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD), are key 
input parameters to the regulatory capital calculation. 
As a consequence, validation of these three parameters 
and the underlying rating system is a key component 
of the supervisory review process. 
Explicit requirements in the revised Framework under-
line the need to validate internal rating systems. Banks 
must demonstrate to their supervisors that they can 
assess the performance of their internal ratings and 
their risk estimation systems consistently and mean-
ingfully. More detailed requirements demand, for ex-
ample, that realised default rates have to be within an 
expected range, that banks must use different quantita-
tive validation tools and that well articulated internal 
standards must exist for situations where significant 
deviations occur between observed values of the three 
risk components and their estimates. 
The design of a validation methodology depends on 
the type of rating system. Rating systems can differ in 
various ways, depending on the borrower type, the 
materiality of the exposure, the dynamic properties of 
the rating methodology (e.g., point-in-time vs. 
through-the-cycle), and the availability of default data 
and external credit-quality assessments (external 
ratings, vendor models). As a consequence, valida-
tion is a relatively complex issue and requires a good 
understanding of the rating system and its properties. 
The following part summarizes the work of the 
Validation Group. This group was formed by the 
Research Task Force to explore validation method-
ologies for rating systems from a theoretical per-
spective and to assess current validation practices in 
the banking industry. 
The Validation Group has explored a broad range of 
qualitative and quantitative validation techniques. It 
has considered contributions from the literature and 
the results from a bank survey in order to under-
stand how validation is treated in academia as well 
as in the banking industry. 
The validation project has progressed in three stages. 
The first stage began with a literature survey on valida-
tion methods and their performance in banking prac-
tice. This was important for developing a common 
terminology and for a classification of rating systems. 
A key result of the first stage was that statistical tests 
are less meaningful to validate PD estimation than they 
are in the case of internal market risk models. There-
fore, backtesting based on statistical tests is generally 
not powerful enough to determine if an internal rating 
system is acceptable. Consequently, the focus of the 
project was extended to benchmarking. 
1.3.1. Key components of validation. An important 
issue at the outset of the project was to describe the 
key components of validation as a concept. The vali-
dation process involves the examination of the rating 
system and the estimation process and methods for 
the risk components PD, LGD and EAD. It also re-
quires verification of the minimum requirements for 
the IRB approach. The application of validation 
methods is closely linked to the type of rating system 
and its underlying data basis. E.g., ratings for small 
business lending will typically be of a more quantita-
tive nature, based on a rather large quantity of data. 
Sovereign ratings instead will typically lay more 
emphasis on qualitative aspects because these bor-
rowers are more opaque and default data are scarce. 
Figure 2 shows key components of a validation 
methodology. 
 
Source: internal sources. 
Fig. 2. Validation components1
                                                 
1 EU Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VII, Part 4, point 83. 
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Individual banks undertake validation as a means of 
ensuring that the output produced by internal rating 
systems is suitable for internal uses and to verify 
compliance with the use test as defined in the re-
vised Framework. In an examination, supervisors 
evaluate the validation conducted by the individual 
bank. As a result, supervisors may use some of the 
same validation techniques as the banks.  
Validation by a banking institution consists of two 
main components: validation of the rating system 
and the estimates of the risk components (PD, LGD, 
and EAD), and validation of the rating process, fo-
cusing on how the rating system is implemented. 
The validation of the rating system can be further 
broken down into two components; the evaluation 
of the rating system design or model design and an 
assessment of the estimates of the risk components. 
In both cases, qualitative and quantitative methods 
can be applied.  
In case of a model-based rating system, the valida-
tion of the model design should include, for exam-
ple, a qualitative review of the statistical model 
building technique, the relevance of the data used to 
build the model for the bank’s specific business 
segment, the way the risk factors that are the key 
inputs to the models were selected, and whether 
they are economically meaningful. 
In the analysis of the estimates of the model pa-
rameters PD, LGD and EAD we differentiate be-
tween backtesting and benchmarking: 
♦ Backtesting means the use of statistical methods 
to compare estimates of the three risk compo-
nents to realized outcomes. This differs from the 
traditional backtesting of market risk models in 
an important way. Whereas for market risk 
models backtesting involves the whole model, 
for internal rating systems only the risk compo-
nents (model inputs) are tested and the “model” 
is provided by the supervisor in the shape of the 
risk-weight functions; 
♦ Benchmarking refers to a comparison of internal 
estimates across banks and/or with external 
benchmarks (e.g., external ratings, vendor mod-
els, or models developed by supervisory au-
thorities). 
In addition to an evaluation of the rating system, 
validation comprises an evaluation of the rating 
process. This involves important issues like data 
quality, the internal reporting, how problems are 
handled and how the rating system is used by the 
credit officers. It also entails the training of credit 
officers and a uniform application of the rating sys-
tem across different branches. Although quantitative 
techniques are useful, especially for the assessment 
of data quality, the validation of the rating process is 
mainly qualitative in nature and should rely on the 
skills and experience of typical banking supervisors. 
1.3.2. Validation of PD, LGD and EAD. Estimation 
and validation methodologies for PD are signifi-
cantly more advanced than those for LGD and EAD. 
For all three risk components, the use of statistical 
tests for backtesting is severely limited by data con-
straints. Therefore, a key issue for the near future is 
the building of consistent data sets in banks. Initia-
tives to pool data that have been started by private 
banking associations may be an important step for-
ward in this direction, especially for smaller banks. 
For the validation of PDs, we differentiate between 
two stages: validation of the discriminatory power 
of a rating system and validation of the accuracy of 
the PD quantification (calibration). Numerous 
methods exist for the assessment of the discrimina-
tory power. The most common techniques are the 
cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) and the accuracy 
ratio, which condenses the information of the CAP 
into a single number. Portfolio dependent confi-
dence intervals that allow statistical inference from 
the accuracy ratio are given in the report. 
Compared with the evaluation of the discriminatory 
power, methods for validating calibration are at a 
much earlier stage. However, stimulated by the pro-
gress of Basel II, such methods have attracted con-
siderable interest in academic research. A major 
obstacle to backtesting of PDs is the scarcity of data, 
caused by the infrequency of default events and the 
impact of default correlation. Even if the final 
minimum requirements of the revised Framework 
for the length of time series for PDs (five years) are 
met, the explanatory power of statistical tests will 
still be limited. Due to correlation between defaults 
in a portfolio, observed default rates can systemati-
cally exceed the critical PD values if these are de-
termined under the assumption of independence of 
the default events. This can happen easily for oth-
erwise well-calibrated rating systems. As a conse-
quence, on the one hand, all tests based on the inde-
pendence assumption are rather conservative, with 
even well-behaved rating systems performing 
poorly in these tests. On the other hand, tests that 
take into account correlation between defaults will 
only allow the detection of relatively obvious cases 
of rating system miscalibration. Therefore, statisti-
cal tests alone will be insufficient to adequately 
validate an internal rating system. Nevertheless, 
banks should be expected to use various quantitative 
validation techniques, as they are still valuable tools 
for detecting weaknesses in rating systems. 
Due to the limitations of using statistical tests to 
verify the accuracy of the calibration, benchmarking 
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can be a valuable complementary tool for the valida-
tion of estimates for the risk components PD, LGD 
and EAD. Benchmarking involves the comparison 
of a bank’s ratings or estimates to results from alter-
native sources. It is quite flexible in the sense that it 
gives banks and supervisors latitude to select appro-
priate benchmarks. An important technical issue is 
the design of the mapping from an individual bank’s 
estimates to the benchmark. If benchmarking is 
carried out by the bank, its supervisory authority 
may choose to focus primarily on assessing the qual-
ity of the benchmark and the quality of the mapping. 
A dynamic approach to benchmarking seems to be 
promising, and would allow supervisors to make 
inferences about the characteristics of the internal 
rating system. Despite the usefulness of benchmark-
ing, it should be used as a complement to, not a sub-
stitute for, statistical validation methods. 
Compared to PD, much less is known about what 
drives LGD. Therefore, the studies concentrate more 
on issues that affect the estimation of LGD than on 
validation methods. 
In general, four methods are available for the esti-
mation of LGDs: a workout LGD based on the dis-
counted cash flows after default; a market LGD 
based on prices of traded defaulted loans; an implied 
market LGD that is derived from non-defaulted 
bond prices by means of an asset pricing model; and 
(in the special case of a retail portfolio) an implied 
historical LGD based on the experience of total 
losses and PD estimates. The studies in this volume 
focus on workout LGDs because they appear likely 
to be a common methodological choice of banks 
attempting to meet the IRB minimum requirements. 
Several critical issues for the estimation of workout 
LGDs are highlighted in the studies, including how 
to measure recoveries, how to allocate workout 
costs, and how to select an appropriate discount 
factor. Other important issues for estimation include 
consistency between the definitions of default used 
for PD and LGD, and the precise definition of losses 
(for instance whether the observed losses are cen-
sored by forcing them to be non-negative). 
The obstacles that impede the validation of LGD are 
also present when EAD is estimated and validated. 
The key problem here is to determine the potential 
future draw-down of unused commitments. Literature 
on the estimation and validation of EADs is virtually 
non-existent and data constraints are even more se-
vere than for LGDs, where at least one can draw 
some inferences from publicly available bond data. 
1.3.3. Dynamics of rating system. Under Basel II, an 
IRB bank will be required to report a quantitative 
assessment of the probability of default for each 
obligor represented in its loan portfolio. The process 
by which PDs are assigned to obligors is clearly 
articulated in the revised Framework1. An IRB bank 
must first assign obligors to “risk buckets”. All ob-
ligors assigned to a bucket should share the same 
credit quality as assessed by the bank’s internal 
credit rating system. Once obligors have been 
grouped into risk buckets, the bank must calculate a 
“pooled PD” for each bucket. The credit-risk capital 
charges associated with exposures to each obligor 
will reflect the pooled PD for the risk bucket to 
which the obligor is assigned. 
The revised Framework establishes minimum stan-
dards for IRB banks’ internal rating processes and 
outlines permissible approaches to estimating 
pooled PDs, but it permits banks a great deal of 
latitude in determining how obligors are assigned to 
buckets and how pooled PDs for those buckets are 
calculated2. Although this flexibility allows banks to 
make maximum use of their own internal rating and 
credit data systems in quantifying PDs, it also raises 
important challenges for PD validation. Supervisors 
and bank risk managers will not be able to apply a 
single formulaic approach to PD validation because 
dynamic properties of pooled PDs depend on each 
bank’s particular approach to rating obligors. Supervi-
sors and risk managers will have to exercise consider-
able skill to verify that a bank’s approach to PD quan-
tification is consistent with its rating philosophy. 
1.3.3.1. Characteristic of obligor-specific default 
probabilities. In its purest form, a probability of 
default is a forward-looking forecast of the likeli-
hood that a particular obligor will default over a 
fixed assessment horizon (usually one year). Not all 
banks have systems in place for explicitly estimat-
ing default probabilities at the obligor level, and the 
revised Framework does not require that IRB banks 
develop such systems. Rather, the revised Frame-
work requires that IRB banks be capable of assign-
ing aggregate pooled PDs to risk buckets composed 
of many obligors. Nonetheless, since a bucket’s 
pooled PD is intended to measure the average PD 
for obligors assigned to that bucket, our analysis of 
the dynamic characteristics of pooled PDs begins by 
focusing on the characteristics of default probabili-
ties associated with individual obligors. 
An obligor-specific PD may incorporate information 
relevant to assessing the obligor’s ability and will-
ingness to repay its debts, as well as information 
about the economic environment in which the obligor 
                                                 
1 BCBS (2004) paragraph 285 stipulates that pooled PDs should be 
linked to risk buckets rather than directly to obligors. Paragraphs 452-
457 define the default event that PDs are intended to forecast. 
2 BCBS (2004) paragraphs 446-451 set out broad standards for the 
quantification of IRB risk components including PDs. Paragraphs 461-
463 discuss specific requirements for assigning pooled PDs to risk 
buckets. 
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operates. It is convenient to divide the information 
available for forecasting defaults into two categories: 
♦ Aggregate information is the information observ-
able at the time a PD is estimated that is shared in 
common by many obligors. This category typi-
cally includes macroeconomic variables such as 
exchange rates, GDP growth rates, etc. 
♦ Obligor-specific information is the information 
that is unique to a particular obligor. Such in-
formation may be relatively static, such as an 
obligor’s line of business, or it may be more dy-
namic in character, such as an obligor’s leverage 
ratio or current revenue. 
Like all economic forecasts, obligor-specific default 
probabilities must either implicitly or explicitly embed 
assumptions about future economic conditions. These 
assumptions may be extrapolated from current condi-
tions, or they may reflect conservative stress scenarios. 
A stress scenario is a collection of assumptions about 
future economic conditions that are unlikely to occur 
over an assessment horizon but would tend to induce 
very high credit losses if they did occur. 
Obligor-specific default probabilities are sensitive to 
the way that they use available information and the 
assumptions under which they are derived. In the 
analysis that follows we will consider two idealized 
representations of obligor-specific PDs. 
♦ Unstressed PD is an unbiased estimate of the 
likelihood that an obligor will default over the 
next year given all currently-available informa-
tion, including static and dynamic obligor char-
acteristics and aggregate data. Because this PD 
makes use of observable macroeconomic data, it 
is likely to fall as macroeconomic conditions 
improve and rise as they deteriorate. 
♦ Stressed PD measures the likelihood that an obli-
gor will default over the next year using all avail-
able obligor information, but assuming adverse 
stress-scenario economic conditions. Because this 
PD makes use of dynamic obligor characteristics it 
will change as an obligor’s individual characteris-
tics change, but it will tend not to be highly corre-
lated with the business cycle. 
Figure 3 illustrates how these two different types of 
PDs might evolve over time for a single obligor. In 
this example, a business cycle peak occurs in years 
2 and 3 and a trough occurs in years 7 and 8. Notice 
that the unstressed PD declines during expansion 
years and rises during recession years. At any par-
ticular date, most of the deviation of the unstressed 
PD from its long-run average is related to the busi-
ness cycle. The stressed PD is “cyclically neutral” in 
the sense that while it moves as the obligor’s par-
ticular circumstances change, it does not respond to 
changes in overall business conditions. 
 
Note: dashed lines show long-run average obligor PDs. 
Source: studies on the validation of internal rating system. 
Fig. 3. Hypothetical stressed and unstressed default 
probabilities for a single obligor over a business cycle 
1.3.3.2. Classification of rating system. All credit 
rating systems assign obligors to risk buckets that 
are intended to distinguish among obligors of differ-
ing credit quality. However, different rating systems 
accomplish this task in different ways. Some banks 
rely almost entirely on empirical credit scoring 
models. Statistical models map obligor characteris-
tics to credit scores and obligors with similar scores 
are then grouped into common risk buckets. Other 
systems rely more heavily on expert judgment. Prac-
titioners use the terms “point-in-time” or “through-
the-cycle” to describe the dynamic characteristics of 
rating systems, but these terms often mean different 
things to different people. Broadly, point-in-time 
systems attempt to produce ratings that are respon-
sive to changes in current business conditions while 
through-the-cycle systems attempt to produce ordi-
nal rankings of obligors that tend not to change over 
the business cycle. Point-in-time systems tend to 
focus on the current conditions of an obligor, while 
through-the-cycle systems tend to focus on an obli-
gor’s likely performance at the trough of a business 
cycle or during adverse business conditions. 
♦ Point-in-time (PIT) rating system uses all cur-
rently available obligor-specific and aggregate 
information to assign obligors to risk buckets. 
Obligors with the same PIT grade are likely to 
share similar unstressed PDs. An obligor’s rat-
ing can be expected to change rapidly as its 
economic prospects change. Overall, PIT ratings 
will tend to fall during economic downturns and 
rise during economic expansions. 
♦ Through-the-cycle (TTC) rating system uses static 
and dynamic obligor characteristics but tends not 
to adjust ratings in response to changes in macro-
economic conditions. Obligors with the same TTC 
grade are likely to share similar stressed PDs. An 
individual obligor’s rating may change as its own 
dynamic characteristics change, but the distribu-
tion of ratings across obligors will not change sig-
nificantly over the business cycle. 
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Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate simple examples of 
point-in-time and through-the-cycle rating assign-
ments based on the same obligor-specific PDs plot-
ted in Figure 3. Notice that as the obligor’s unstressed 
PD changes, its PIT rating changes as well. Near the 
peak of the business cycle the obligor receives a 
higher PIT rating and near the trough of the cycle it 
receives a lower rating. In contrast, the TTC rating is 
tied to the obligor’s unstressed PD. This PD fluctu-
ates over time, but is not correlated with the business 
cycle. As a result, the obligor’s TTC rating does not 
reflect changes in overall business conditions1. 
 
Source: studies on the validation of internal rating system. 
Fig. 4. Example of a three-grade point-in-time rating system 
tied to an obligors unstressed PD 
 
Source: studies on the validation of internal rating system. 
Fig. 5. Example of a three-grade through-the-cycle rating 
system tied to an obligors stressed PD 
1.3.4. Loss Given Default Validation. LGD is an 
important element of the IRB approach to capital 
measurement. LGD is particularly important be-
cause the minimum regulatory capital charge is 
highly sensitive to the LGD that is reported by a 
financial institution. Under the advanced approach, 
                                                 
1 Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems (May 2005). 
Working Paper No. 14. 
financial institutions are allowed to use internally 
derived measures of LGD rather than a standard 
LGD given by the revised Framework. Thus, the 
validation of internal measures of LGD is crucial to 
the validation of the appropriateness of the capital 
measures. 
1.3.4.1. Definition of LGD. In general, LGD is the 
loss, expressed as a percentage of the EAD, on a 
credit facility if the credit defaults2. We can further 
refine this definition to distinguish between the ex-
post measures of LGD on defaulted facilities and 
ex-ante measure on non-defaulted facilities.  
LGD for a non-defaulted facility can be defined as 
the ex-ante estimate of loss conditional on the de-
fault, expressed as a percentage of the EAD. The LGD 
associated with a non-defaulted facility can be viewed 
as a random variable. Frequently, we are interested in 
having one figure for the value of the LGD which is 
typically based on an estimate for the expectation of 
this random variable, i.e. expected LGD.  
LGD for a defaulted facility is the ex-post loss ex-
pressed as a percentage of the exposure at the time of 
default. If there is complete information on all of the 
losses related to a facility, and a method to calculate 
losses has been chosen, we can directly calculate real-
ized LGD. If there is not complete information on the 
losses related to a defaulted facility, for example, if the 
facility is in the process of workout, LGD is a random 
variable. We can calculate an estimate of LGD for 
these defaulted facilities by using complete informa-
tion from a sample of similar facilities. 
A reference data set (RDS), which includes realized 
LGDs on defaulted facilities, can be used to esti-
mate LGD on non-defaulted facilities. There are 
different methods that can be used to assign an LGD 
to non-defaulted facilities. These can be classified as 
subjective and objective methods according to the 
type of input used. 
♦ Subjective methods are based on expert 
judgment. Banks use these methods in portfolios 
for which there are no defaults or at the early 
stages of use of their internal models. 
♦ Objective methods use numerical data 
containing information on LGD as the main 
input. Additionally, it is possible to subdivide 
objective methods into explicit and implicit 
methods. 
In explicit methods, the LGD is estimated for 
each facility using a reference data set (RDS) of 
defaulted facilities. The first step is to determine 
the realized LGD of each facility included in the 
                                                 
2 Under the advanced approach, “LGD must be measured as the loss given 
default as a percentage of the EAD”. BCBS (2004), paragraph 297. 
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RDS. The second step consists of assigning an 
LGD to each non-defaulted facility (using a 
model)1. As we will show in following sections, 
the loss can be computed using either market 
values (explicit market LGD) or discounted 
cash-flows derived from the recovery process 
(workout LGD). 
Implicit methods are not based on the realized 
LGD on defaulted facilities contained in RDS. 
Instead, LGD is derived using a measure of total 
losses and PD estimates. 
Table 2. Classification of the objective methods to 
obtain LGDs 


































experience Historical total 
losses and 
estimated PD 
Implied historical LGD Retail 
Source: studies on the validation of internal rating system. 
1.3.4.2. Workout LGD. This section looks at the 
process of computing the workout loss of a de-
faulted facility, and discusses issues related to the 
measurement of the various components of the 
workout LGD including recoveries, costs and the 
discount rate. 
There are three main components for computing a 
workout loss: the recoveries (cash or noncash), the 
costs (direct and indirect) and the discount factor 
that will be fundamental to express all cash flows in 
terms of monetary units at the date of default. If all 
the cash flows associated with a defaulted facility 
from the date of default to the end of the recovery 
process are known (i.e. we have complete informa-
tion) then the realized LGD, measured as percentage 
of the EAD at the time of default, is given by: 


















1     (1) 
where Ri is each of the i discounted recoveries of the 
defaulted facility, Pj is each of the j discounted 
                                                 
1 The easiest procedure is to use the sample mean of the realized LGDs 
in the reference data set, though there are more sophisticated rocedures. 
payments or costs during the recovery period, and r 
represents a discount rate. 
When loss is calculated by setting all negative ob-
servations of loss to zero, as shown in equation (2), 
it is referred to as censoring the data. 


















01    (2) 
Censoring the data does not change the definition of 
default. In contrast, when defaults with zero or 
negative LGD are removed from the dataset, re-
ferred to as truncating the data, the definition of 
default has changed. 
If the data have not been censored or truncated, then 
the realizations of LGD could be negative (represent-
ing an economic gain on the asset)2. This would be 
more likely if the definition of default was broader, 
such as 30-days past due. In principle, the constraint of 
realized LGD being greater or equal to zero, for regu-
latory purposes, can be imposed for prudential reasons. 
However, banks do not necessarily impose this condi-
tion in their estimates for non-regulatory use (for in-
stance, pricing). 
1.3.4.3. Validation of LGD. The LGD validation 
process involves the examination of all the ele-
ments that are needed to produce LGD estimates. 
This includes all of the assumptions made to con-
struct a reference data set, calculate realized 
LGD, and generate LGD estimates from the refer-
ence data set. Validation also requires verification 
that the minimum regulatory requirements are 
met. Figure 6 below presents an example of the 
validation process. The same type of process can 
be used to verify that LGD estimates used for 
internal capital purposes are appropriate as well. 
At each step in the figure, both the assumptions 
made and the calculation must be validated. 
Consider a grade that contains facilities with the 
same or similar type of collateral, product, industry, 
purpose, etc3. Given a facility of this grade, for 
which an LGD has to be estimated, the first step is 
to obtain a reference data set (RDS) of defaulted 
facilities4. This RDS must include seven years of 
data for corporate but for retail five years are 
enough (ideally a complete economic cycle)5, use a 
definition of default consistent with the one used to 
                                                 
2 Typically, this occurs when the opportunity cost implicit in the 
discount rate is lower than the income from interest and fees on the 
defaulted loan. Censoring the data is consistent with not recognizing 
future margin income. 
3 BCBS (2004), paragraph 399. 
4 It is assumed that there are enough data in the RDS. 
5 BCBS (2004), paragraphs 472 and 473. 
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estimate PDs (ideally the same definition)1, and 
include internal and/or external facilities similar to 
the given facility2. The reference data set should 




Source: studies of the validation of internal rating systems. 
Fig. 6. Example of the validation process 
1.3.4.4. Modelling LGD. LGD = 100% - Recovery 
Rate % + Economic Cost Rate% 
In detail: 
Aqi = Sum of all recoveries within the recovery 
period (see later) referring to defaults occurred in 
a pool in a defined measurement period (e.g., one 
quarter – qi); Bqi = Sum of all costs related to col-
lections within the recovery period referring to 
the recoveries included in Aqi ; Cqi = Sum of all 
amounts defaulted in the given measurement pe-
riod (sum of EADs of defaulted exposures). 
I suggest a measurement period of one quarter qi.  
Then the LGD per quarter and pool is defined as 
follows: 
LGDqi  = 100% - ( Aqi – Bqi ) / Cqi .    (1) 
Recoveries must belong to the respective default 
accounts in the given 5 year period. 
Recoveries from realizing collateral (e.g., mort-
gage) might begin to show only after 2-3 years, 
depending on the legal situation. This implies an 
understated recovery rate. For that reason it is 
suggested to apply a default weighted average of 
at least two real annual recovery ratios in estima-
tion of recoveries of products with a long recov-
ery period (one year and more)  
Note: 
1) The number of years necessary to know what 
the recovery rate of a defaulted account will 
be is product and country dependent. 
2) LGD should include cost of funding. 
3) Future cost (e.g., collection costs) and in-
comes (e.g., recoveries) should be calculated 
as Net Present Values. 
Aqi would cover the amount recoveries in white 
and green areas corresponding to recovery % data 
(see Fig. 7). 123 
 
                                                 
1 BCBS (2004), paragraph 456. 
2 BCBS (2004), paragraphs 448 and 450. 
3 Studies on the validation of internal rating systems (May 2005). 
Working Paper No. 14. 
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Source: internal sources. 
Fig. 7. Recovery – Vintage – Analysis 
LGD per pool: 
LGDpool = (1/ ∑(i=1 to 20) dqi) * ∑(i=1 to 20) (LGD qi  * dqi * 
wqi ),        (1) 
∑(q=1 to 20)  wq = 1,     (2) 
where: dqi is number of defaults in quarter qi; wqi 
defines the weight a bank assigns to a quarter qi ; 
LGDqi – Loss given default in quarter qi. 
Note: 
1) Provided that sufficient data are available, for 
best risk management practices, banks should 
compute LGD at individual exposure level 
(rather than pool level) using scoring models. 
As a result, better credit decisions can be made 
using Expected Loss Rate (ELR = PD * LGD) 
rather than expected bad rate alone (i.e., PD). 
This will fulfil the Basel II “use test” require-
ment in helping banks to better: 
♦ accept applicants; 
♦ set credit limit; 
♦ prioritize collections; 
♦ define pricing; 
♦ set provisions. 
2) Recoveries since default; this will mostly be 
recoveries after 90 days past due. Collected fees 
from defaulted borrowers, including fees for late 
payment, may be treated as recoveries for the 
purpose of the bank’s LGD estimation. Unpaid 
late fees, to the extent that they have been capi-
talized in the bank’s income statement, must be 
added to the bank’s measure of exposure or loss. 
3) Economic cost since default; e.g., legal costs, 
total operational costs of the function related to 
collections of defaulted accounts. If a country 
outsources 90+ collections to an agency and this 
agency would gain a percentage of x% of the 
recovered amount, this percentage would also 
be found in the ‘Economic Cost Rate’. 
4) It will be up to the countries to develop an LGD 
scorecard based on defaulted accounts covering 
demographic, collateral, behavioral data and 
measured ‘real’ LGD on account level. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of a stylized model of rating systems indi-
cates that the default probability assigned to each 
obligor rating grade and its dynamics strongly de-
pend on the type of rating methodology and quanti-
fication techniques employed. Therefore, banks and 
supervisors should take into account differences in 
rating assignment methods and quantification ap-
proaches when applying a validation methodology. 
The dynamics of default probabilities assigned to 
rating grades are explored by analyzing the proper-
ties of stylized rating systems of the types often 
described as point-in-time and through-the-cycle. 
The impact of using idealized stressed rather than 
unstressed obligor specific PDs to determine the 
pooled PD for a risk “bucket” (such as an internal 
obligor grade) is also considered. The analysis of 
these stylized rating systems provides some interest-
ing insights into the impact of using the approaches 
outlined in the revised Framework (i.e., the histori-
cal default experience approach, the statistical 
model approach or the external mapping approach) 
for PD estimation in different rating systems. 
The results of this analysis suggest that the pooled 
default probability assigned to each rating grade and 
its dynamics strongly depend on the type of rating 
system and the PD estimation method. The estima-
tion from historical default rates is most meaningful 
when the pooled PDs are unstressed, which means 
that they are unbiased estimates of the likelihood of 
default in the following year. Furthermore, the 
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analysis suggests that the long-run average default 
frequency for a through-the-cycle bucket will not 
provide a good approximation of that bucket’s un-
stressed pooled PD. The reason is that the un-
stressed pooled PD will tend to be lower than the 
long-run average default frequency during cyclical 
peaks and higher than the long-run average default 
frequency during cyclical troughs. 
The statistical models approach is potentially more 
flexible, but is only as accurate as the underlying sta-
tistical models used to estimate obligor-specific PDs. 
In the case of external mapping, the analysis sug-
gests that if there are differences in the dynamics of 
a bank’s internal rating system and the external rat-
ing system used to quantify pooled PDs, then one 
might expect the mapping between internal and 
external grades to change from year to year. Only if 
a bank’s approach to setting internal ratings is the 
same as that used in setting the external ratings one 
can expect the mapping between the two systems to 
remain stable over time. 
References 
1. ALLEN, L., SAUNDERS, A. (2004) Special Issue on ‘the Path to Basel II Adoption’. Journal of Financial Ser-
vices Research, No. 26 (October), 101-191. 
2. ALTMAN, E.I., SABATO, G. (2005) Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for 
SMEs. Journal of Financial Services Research, No. 28 (October), 15-42. 
3. Bank for International Settlements (2002) Consensus Achieved on Basel II Proposals. Press Release, May 11, 
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p040511.htm. 
4. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2002) Quantitative Impact Statement, No. 3, available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3.htm. 
5. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems. Working 
Paper No. 14 (May). ISSN 1561-8854. 
6. BERGER, A.N., FRAME, W.S., MILLER, N.H. (2005) Credit Scoring and the Availability, Price, and Risk of 
Small Business Credit. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, No. 37 (April), 191-232. 
7. FRAME, W.S., SRINIVASAN, A., WOOSLEY, L. (2001) The Effect of Credit Scoring on Small Business Lend-
ing. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2001, No. 33 (August), 813-825. 
8. HAKENES, H., SCHNABEL, I. (2004) Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel II. Max Plank Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods Working Paper. 
9. MORGAN, D.P., ASHCRAFT, A.B. (2003) Using Loan rates to Measure and Regulate Bank Risk: Findings and 
an Immodest Proposal. Journal of Financial Services Research, October-December, No. 24, 181-200. 
10. REPULLO, R., SUAREZ, J. (2004) Loan Pricing Under Basel Capital Requirements. Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, No. 13 (October), 496-521. EU Directive 2006/48/EC. 
 
